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1962/10/30

REVIEWED by Moscow DATE 1/27/88

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RECOMMENDATION UN DISMANTLEMENT OF OFFENSIVE WEAPONS IN CUBA

(X) DENY () Non-responsive info.

FOI, EO or PA exemptions (b)(1) (b)(5)

TS authority to:

The Problem

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To develop a plan which will provide for immediately rendering inoperative

all offensive missiles and jet bomber aircraft in Cuba under UN supervision.

At the present time we have evidence [

bombers in Cuba capable of delivering thermonuclear weapons. There are [missile bases each of which has 3 or 4 missile pads and

missile erectors. The bombers are located on less than half-a-dozen airfields.

It is assumed that Cuba agrees to render her offensive weapons inoperable.

The UN force will monitor compliance but will not closely examine any of the weapons or their support equipment. To meet these constraints the following program is proposed.

Missiles

1. Move all missiles on their transporters to an open assembly area such as Santa Clara or San Antonio de los Banas airfield so that they may be maintained under constant surveillance by UN personnel.

2. Move all missile erectors, check out vans and missile warheads to another open assembly area, remote from the missile depots. Mariel airfield is suggested.

3. Drain fuel from missiles and all fuel and oxidizer transportation vehicles, and move to another open assembly area such as Cornet Pasqual. Remove radio guidance control from missiles and move to area such as Cornet Pasqual.

Aircraft

1. Concentrate all jet bomber aircraft at San Julian airfield.

2. Remove all munitions from aircraft and place under 24 hour guard.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR

REVIEWED by AME Date 2/6/90

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3. Remove aircraft engines from bomber aircraft and store in separate area under 24 hour guard.

Personnel

While the security of the areas should remain under control of present personnel, technical and operational personnel should be assembled at certain sites where surveillance can be maintained by UN personnel.

Discussion

The above operation will require close monitoring by the UN team and 24 hour surveillance at all missile sites, bomber airfields, and areas where missile site equipment has been assembled. In order to insure adequate surveillance by available UN personnel, weapon movements should be carried out in daylight to the maximum extent possible and all weapons should be placed in open areas which can be readily observed.

We estimate that [] men will be required to adequately monitor the operation. This will include [] men to monitor the [] missile sites, [] men to monitor the [] assembly areas, and [] men to monitor the bomber concentration area. This does not include support personnel. 81

The UN force should have the right to check areas where undeclared missiles or bomber aircraft may be located.

These recommendations refer to items of equipment which are designed for road mobility and therefore the program can and should be accomplished within 24 hours.

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